01a Articolo in rivista

HALG: Highlights of Algorithms
Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids

Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study budget feasible mechanisms with the goal of procuring an independent set of a matroid. More specifically, we are given a matroid M= (E, I). Each element of the ground set E is controlled by a selfish agent and the cost of the element...
Sequential Posted-Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations
Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions

We develop and extend a line of recent work on the design of mechanisms for two-sided markets. The markets we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and the aim of a mechanism is to improve the social welfare by arranging purchases and sales of the items. A mechanism is given...
Designing Cost-Sharing Methods for Bayesian Games

We study the design of cost-sharing protocols for two fundamental resource allocation problems, the Set Cover and the Steiner Tree Problem, under environments of incomplete information (Bayesian model). Our objective is to design protocols where the worst-case Bayesian Nash equilibria have low...
Online Network Design with Outliers
Efficient computation of the Weighted Clustering Coefficient
Online Network Design with Outliers
Stochastic Query Covering for Fast Approximate Document Retrieval
On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets