## **A Proofs**

**Theorem 1** For any objective sentence about situation s,  $\phi(s)$ ,<sup>5</sup>

$$Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \phi(end[\sigma])$$

if and only if

$$Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \mathbf{Know}(\phi(now), end[\sigma])$$

*Proof Sketch:*  $\leftarrow$  Follows trivially from the reflexivity of K in the initial situation, and the fact that it is preserved by the successor state axiom for K.

 $\Rightarrow$  From the successor state axiom for K it follows that:

$$Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma'] \cdot (a, 1)\} \models \mathbf{Know}(SF_a(now), end[\sigma' \cdot (a, 1)]) \quad (*)$$
$$Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma'] \cdot (a, 0)\} \models \mathbf{Know}(\neg SF_a(now), end[\sigma' \cdot (a, 0)])(**)$$

Suppose not, i.e., there exists a model M of  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\}$  such that for some s' such that  $M \models K(s', end[\sigma]), M \models \neg \phi(s')$ .

Then take the structure M' obtained from M by intersecting the objects of sort situation with those that in the situation tree rooted in the initial ancestor situation of s', say  $s'_0$ . M' satisfies all axioms in Axioms except the reflexivity axiom, the successor state axiom for K, and the initial state axiom, which is of the form **Know**( $\Psi(now), S_0$ ) (note that the other axioms involve neither K nor  $S_0$ ). Observe that Trans and Final for the situation in the tree are defined by considering relations involving only situation in the same tree.

Now consider the M'' obtained from M' by adding the constant  $S_0$  and making it denote  $s'_0$ . Although M' and M'' does not satisfy **Know**( $\Psi(now), S_0$ ), we have that  $M'' \models \Psi(S_0)$ . Moreover, (\*) and (\*\*) and the fact that the successor state axiom for K in M ensure that all predecessor of s' where K alternatives, imply  $M'' \models Sensed[\sigma]$ .

Finally let us define M''' by adding to M'' the predicate K and making denote the identity relation on situations. Then  $M''' \models Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\}$ . On the other hand since  $M' \models \neg \phi(s')$  so does M'''. Thus getting a contradiction.

**Theorem 2** Let dp be such that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models EFDP(dp, end[\sigma])$ . Then,  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f.Do(dp, end[\sigma], s_f)$  if and only if all online executions of  $(dp, \sigma)$  are terminating.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Note that K cannot appear in the  $\phi(s)$ , however *Trans* and *Final* can, since they are predicates, although axiomatized using a second-order formula.

**Proof Sketch:** First of all we observe that dp is a deterministic program and its possible online executions from  $\sigma$  are completely determined by the sensing outcomes. We also observe that in each model there will be a single execution of dp, since the sensing outcomes are fully determined in the model. Moreover, in all models where with the same sensing outcomes up to a given configuration  $(dp_i, s_i)$ , the next transition of dp from  $end[\sigma]$  is the same.

 $\Rightarrow \text{If } Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f. Do(dp, end[\sigma], s_f) \text{ then in every model} \\ \text{of } Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \text{ the only execution of } dp \text{ from } end[\sigma] \text{ terminates. Consider an online execution reaching } (dp_i, \sigma_i). \text{ Then, in all models of } Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \text{ with sensing outcomes as determined by } \sigma_i, \text{ the next configuration } (dp_{i+1}, s_{i+1}) \text{ is the same, given that } LEFDP(dp_i, end[\sigma_i]) \text{ requires the next transition to be known in each of these models, and hence by reflexivity of K we have that such a transition is true as well in each of them. Then, for all a possible online transitions from <math>(dp_i, end[\sigma_i])$  to  $dp'_i, end[\sigma'_i]$  it must be the case that  $dp'_i = dp_{i+1}$  and  $end[\sigma'_i] = s_{i+1}$ , i.e. the next online transitions can differ only wrt the new sensing outcome acquired.

 $\leftarrow$  If an online execution of dp from  $\sigma$  terminates it means that the program dp, from  $end[\sigma]$ , terminates in all models of  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\}$  with the sensing outcome as in the online execution. Since by hypothesis all online executions terminate, thus covering all possible sensing outcome, then dp, from  $end[\sigma]$ , terminates in all models.

**Theorem 3** If  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Trans(\Sigma_e(p), end[\sigma], p', s'), then$ 

- 1.  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f. Do(p, end[\sigma], s_f)$
- 2.  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f. Do(\Sigma_e(p), end[\sigma], s_f)$
- 3. All online executions from  $(\Sigma_e(p), \sigma)$  terminate.

*Proof Sketch*: (1) and (2) follow immediately from the definition of Trans for  $\Sigma_e$ .

(3) By the definition of Trans for  $\Sigma_e$ , there exists a dp and such that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models EFDP(dp, end[\sigma]) \land \exists s_f. Trans(dp, end[\sigma], p', s') \land Do(p', s', s_f)$ . The conditions of Theorem 2 are satisfied, thus we have that all online executions from  $(dp, \sigma)$  are terminating. Since these include all online executions from  $(p', \sigma')$  with  $s' = end[\sigma']$ , all online executions from  $(p', \sigma')$  must also be terminating. Hence the thesis follows.

**Theorem 4** Let dpt be a tree program, i.e.,  $dpt \in TREE$ . Then, for all histories  $\sigma$ ,

if  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f.Do(dpt, end[\sigma], s_f), then Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models EFDP(dpt, end[\sigma]).$ 

*Proof Sketch:* By induction on the structure of *dpt*.

Base cases: for *nil*, it is known that *nil* is *Final*, so  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models$ 

 $EFDP(nil, end[\sigma])$  holds; for False?, the antecedent is false, so the thesis holds. Inductive cases: Assume that the thesis holds for  $dpt_1$  and  $dpt_2$ . Assume that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f.Do(dpt, end[\sigma], s_f)$ .

For dpt = a;  $dpt_1$ :  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f.Do(a; dpt_1, end[\sigma], s_f)$  implies that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f.Do(dpt_1, do(a, end[\sigma]), s_f)$ . Since a is a non-sensing action,  $Sensed[\sigma \cdot (a, 1)] = Sensed[\sigma]$ , so we also have  $Axioms \cup Sensed[\sigma \cdot (a, 1)] \models \exists s_f.Do(dpt_1, end[\sigma \cdot (a, 1)], s_f)$ . Thus by the induction hypothesis we have  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma \cdot (a, 1)]\} \models EFDP(dpt_1, end[\sigma \cdot (a, 1)])$ . It follows that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models EFDP(dpt_1, do(a, end[\sigma]))$ . The assumption  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f.Do(a; dpt_1, end[\sigma], s_f)$  also implies that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f.Do(a; dpt_1, end[\sigma], s_f)$  also implies that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Poss(a, end[\sigma])$  and this must be known by Theorem 1, i.e.,  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Know(Poss(a, now), end[\sigma])$ . Thus, we have that

 $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Know(Trans(a; dpt_1, now, dpt_1, do(a, now)), end[\sigma]).$ 

It is also known that this is the only transition possible for  $a; dpt_1$ , So  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models LEFDP(a; dpt_1, end[\sigma])$ . Therefore,  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models EFDP(a; dpt_1, end[\sigma])$ .

For dpt = True?;  $dpt_1$ : the argument is similar, but simpler since the test does not change the situation.

For  $dpt = sense_{\phi}$ ; if  $\phi$  then  $dpt_1$  else  $dpt_2$ : Suppose that the sensing action returns 1 and let  $\sigma_1 = \sigma \cdot (sense_{\phi}, 1)$ . Next we show that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models LEFDP(dpt, end[\sigma])$ . The assumption that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f$ .  $Do(dpt, end[\sigma], s_f)$  implies that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma_1]\} \models \exists s_f$ .  $Do(dpt_1, end[\sigma_1], s_f)$ . Thus by the induction hypothesis we have  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma_1]\} \models \exists s_f$ .  $Do(dpt_1, end[\sigma_1], s_f)$ . Thus by the induction hypothesis we have  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma_1]\} \models EFDP(dpt_1, end[\sigma_1])$ . It follows that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \phi(do(sense_{phi}, end[\sigma]) \supset EFDP(dpt_1, do(sense_{phi}, end[\sigma])$ . By a similar argument, it also follows that we must have that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \neg \phi(do(sense_{phi}, end[\sigma])) \supset EFDP(dpt_2, do(sense_{phi}, end[\sigma])$ . The assumption  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f. Do(dpt, end[\sigma], s_f)$  also implies that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Poss(sense_{\phi}, end[\sigma])$  and this must be known by Theorem 1, i.e.,  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Know(Poss(sense_{\phi}, now), end[\sigma])$ . Thus, we have that

 $\begin{array}{l} Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \textbf{Know}(\\ Trans(dpt, now, \textbf{if } \phi \textbf{ then } dpt_1 \textbf{ else } dpt_2, do(sense_{\phi}, now)), end[\sigma]). \end{array}$ 

It is also known that this is the only transition possible for dpt, so  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models LEFDP(dpt, end[\sigma])$ . Thus,  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models$ 

 $EFDP(dpt, end[\sigma])$ .

## **Theorem 5** For any program dp that is

- 1. an epistemically feasible deterministic program, i.e.,  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models EFDP(dp, end[\sigma]) \text{ and}$
- 2. such that there is a known bound on the number of steps it needs to terminate, i.e., where there is an n such that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists p', s', k.k \leq n \wedge Trans^k(dp, end[\sigma], p', s') \wedge Final(p', s'),$

there exists a tree program  $dpt \in TREE$  such that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \forall s_f.Do(dp, end[\sigma], s_f) \equiv Do(dpt, end[\sigma], s_f).$ 

*Proof Sketch:* We construct the tree program  $dpt = m(dp, \sigma)$  from dp using the following rules:

- $m(dp, \sigma) = False$ ? iff  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\}$  is inconsistent, otherwise
- $m(dp, \sigma) = nil \text{ iff}$  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Final(dp, end[\sigma]), \text{ otherwise}$
- m(dp, σ) = a; m(dp', σ ⋅ (a, 1)) iff Axioms ∪ {Sensed[σ]} ⊨ Trans(dp, end[σ], dp', do(a, end[σ]) for some non-sensing action a,
- $m(dp, \sigma) = sense_{\phi}$ ; if  $\phi$  then  $m(dp_1, \sigma \cdot (sense_{\phi}, 1))$ else  $m(dp_2, \sigma \cdot (sense_{\phi}, 0))$  iff  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Trans(dp, end[\sigma], dp', do(sense_{\phi}, end[\sigma])$  for

some sensing action  $sense_{\phi}$ ,

•  $m(dp, \sigma) = True?; m(dp', \sigma)$  iff  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Trans(dp, end[\sigma], dp', end[\sigma]).$ 

Let us show that

 $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Do(dp, end[\sigma], s_f) \equiv Do(m(dp, \sigma), end[\sigma], s_f).$ 

It turns out that, under the hypothesis of the theorem, for all dp and all  $\sigma$ ,  $(dp, \sigma)$  is bisimilar to  $(m(dp, \sigma), \sigma)$  with respect to online executions. Indeed, it is easy to check that the relation  $[(dp, \sigma), (m(dp, \sigma), \sigma)]$  is a bisimulation, i.e., for all dp and  $\sigma$ ,  $[(dp, \sigma), (m(dp, \sigma), \sigma)]$  implies that

- $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Final(dp, end[\sigma]) \text{ iff } Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Final(m(dp, \sigma), end[\sigma]),$
- for all  $dp', \sigma'$  if  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Trans(dp, end[\sigma], dp', end[sigma'])$ with  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[sigma']\}$  consistent, then  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Trans(m(dp, \sigma), end[\sigma], m(dp', \sigma'), end[\sigma'])$  and  $[(dp', \sigma'), (m(dp', \sigma'), \sigma')]$ ,

• for all dp',  $\sigma'$  if  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Trans(m(dp, \sigma), end[\sigma], m(dp', \sigma'), end[\sigma'])$  with  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[sigma']\}$  consistent, then  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Trans(dp, end[\sigma], dp', end[sigma'])$  and  $[(dp', \sigma'), (m(dp', \sigma'), \sigma')].$ 

Now, assume that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f.Do(dp, end[\sigma], s_f)$ , then since dp is an *EFDP*, by Theorem 2 all online execution from  $(dp, \sigma)$  terminate. Hence since  $(dp, \sigma \text{ and } (m(dp, \sigma), \sigma) \text{ are bisimilar, } (m(dp, \sigma), \sigma) \text{ has the same}$ online execution (apart from the program appearing in the configurations).

Next, observe that given an online execution of  $(dp, \sigma)$  terminating in  $(dp_f, \sigma_f)$ , in all models of  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\}$  with sensing outcomes as in  $\sigma_f$  both the program dp and  $m(dp, \sigma)$  reach the same situation  $end[\sigma_f]$ . Since there are terminating online executions for all possible sensing outcomes, the thesis follows.

**Theorem 6** Let dpl be a linear program, i.e.,  $dpl \in LINE$ . Then, for all histories  $\sigma$ , if  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \exists s_f.Do(dpl, end[\sigma], s_f)$ , then  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models EFDP(dpl, end[\sigma])$ .

*Proof Sketch:* This is a corollary of Theorem 4 for tree programs. Since linear programs are tree programs, the thesis follows immediately from this theorem. ■

**Theorem 7** For any dp that does not include sensing actions, such that

$$Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models EFDP(dp, end[\sigma]),$$

there exists a linear program dpl such that

 $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models \forall s_f. Do(dp, end[\sigma], s_f) \equiv Do(dpl, end[\sigma], s_f).$ 

*Proof Sketch:* We show this using the same approach as for Theorem 5 for tree programs. Since dp cannot contain sensing actions, the construction method used in the proof of Theorem 5 produces a tree program that contains no branching and is in fact a linear program. Then, by the same argument as used there, the thesis follows.

**Theorem 8** Axioms  $\cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Trans(\Sigma_l(p), end[\sigma], dpl, s') \text{ if and only if there exists a situation } s_f \text{ such that } Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Do(p, end[\sigma], s_f).$ 

*Proof Sketch:*  $\Leftarrow$  If for same  $s_f$  we have  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Do(p, end[\sigma], s_f)$  then the sequence of actions from  $end[\sigma]$  to  $s_f$  is an LINE program, which trivially satisfies the left-hand-side of the axiom for  $\Sigma_l$ . Observe that if  $s' = end[\sigma]$  then the linear program can be simply True?.

⇒ By hypothesis there exists a dpl that is a LINE. If s' = s and then dpl = true?; dpl' and if s' = do(a, s), for same action a, and then dpl = a; dpl'. In both cases dpl' must be an LINE. In every model dpl' reaches from s' a final situation of the original program p. Observe that such situation will be the same in every model since the sequence of actions  $\alpha$  starting from s' is fixed by dpl'. It follows that the sequence of action done by dpl starting from s reaches a situation  $s_f$  such that  $Axioms \cup \{Sensed[\sigma]\} \models Do(p, end[\sigma], s_f)$ . ■