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UID:calendar.18654.field_data.0@www.diag.uniroma1.it
DTSTAMP:20260404T145859Z
CREATED:20190911T094359Z
DESCRIPTION:Critical issues in transport economics Department of Computer C
 ontrol and Management EngineeringSeptember 17\, 2019 -  2.30 pm Title: Con
 gestion and Incentives in the Age of Driverless carsAuthors: Boffa\, F.\, 
 Fedele\, A.\, Iozzi\, A.\,                  Abstract                      
        GPS systems and Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) will likely open the way 
 to forms of traffic coordination\, or centralization. We analyze the welfa
 re effects of moving from an environment with atomistic drivers to one in 
 which few companies will manage the traffic. Differently than what happens
  with atomistic drivers\, such companies or organizations will have an inc
 entive to consider the congestion externality imposed by their vehicles on
  the other vehicles they dispatch. We analyze both a setting with no road 
 taxes\, to reflect their limited application and the popular opposition to
  them\, as well as a setting with road taxes. We find that\, without road 
 taxes\, the emergence of a small company supplying a small fraction of the
  travelers (while the others remain atomistic) increases (decreases) welfa
 re if and only if the congestion problem was (was not) sufficiently severe
  in the first place place. With road taxes\, we find that\, while congesti
 on charges are optimal when all travelers are atomistic\, the structure of
  the taxes differs markedly with a company that supplies a mass of custome
 rs. Restoring first best\, in this case\, may require subsidizing the comp
 any -- something likely to be politically very unappealing. Title: Airline
  Mitigation of Propagated Delays: Theory and Empirics on the Choice of Sch
 edule BuffersAuthors: Brueckner\, J.K.\, Czerny\, A.I.\, Gaggero\, A.     
             Abstract                             This paper presents an ex
 tensive theoretical and empirical analysis of the choice of schedule buffe
 rs by airlines. With airline delays a continuing problem around the world\
 , such an undertaking is valuable\, and its lessons extend to other passen
 ger transportation sectors.  One useful lesson from the theoretical analys
 is of a two-flight model is that the first flight's buffer plays no role i
 n mitigating delay propagation\, given that the ground buffer is a perfect
 \, while nondistorting\, substitute.  In addition\, the apportionment of m
 itigation responsibility between the ground buffer and the flight buffer o
 f flight 2 is shown to depend on the relationship between the costs of gro
 und- and flight-buffer time.  The empirical results show the connection be
 tween buffer magnitudes and a host of explanatory variables\, including th
 e variability of flight times\, which simulations of the model identify as
  an important determining factor. Title: Airline competition in the Transa
 tlantic marketAuthors: Dresner\, M.\, Gualini\, A.\, Martini\, G.\, Valli\
 , M.                 Abstract:                          The paper focus on
  North – Atlantic\, one-way\, non-stop O&D flights and consider a route as
  a city-pair. It is an attempt to extend the important and extensive contr
 ibution of Brueckner & Singer (2019) by covering also data sold in Europe 
 and North America. We build a panel dataset that covers flights from Canad
 a and U.S.A. to Europe for 18 months (from January 2017 to June 2018). We 
 investigate the impact of airline alliances and LCCs (mainly Norwegian) on
  fares. After checking for LCCs route selection and model identification\,
  preliminary results show that although\, in general\, alliances are assoc
 iated with lower fares\, on competitive routes\, where 2 carriers from the
  same alliance operate\, fares are significantly higher compared to compet
 itive routes without 2 carriers from the same alliance. Moreover\, althoug
 h monopoly routes have higher fares than competitive routes\, Norwegian op
 erates its routes at significantly lower fares than other carriers operati
 ng monopoly routes. Hence\, to the extent that policymakers want to promot
 e lower fares on transatlantic routes\, they should monitor fares between 
 gateways dominated by carriers from the same alliance. These routes appear
  to have significantly higher fares compared to other competitive routes. 
 Moreover\, they should encourage operations by LCCs on transatlantic route
 s.  Data show that Norwegian has had a similar impact lowering fares on th
 e long-haul transatlantic routes as LCCs have had in Europe and the U.S. T
 itle: Segment and network pricing in the airline industryAuthors: Gaggero\
 , A.\, Piga\, A.                 Abstract                             This
  paper uses Southwest's fares for trips with one layover to investigate em
 pirically the relationship between the overall price of the trip and the p
 rices of the two segments forming the full itinerary. We find that price d
 ifferential between the fare of the full itinerary and the sum of the fare
 s of the segments is always negative\, in line with the theoretical result
  by Brueckner et al 1992. Such a price differential varies during the book
 ing period\, widening as the departure date approaches because of the lowe
 r expected opportunity cost of the seat of each segment. Title: Optimal Ad
 ministered Incentive PricingAuthors: Avenali\, A.\, D'Alfonso\, T.\, Rever
 beri\, P.                 Abstract                            Network infr
 astructures such as airports and railways have special features. First\, t
 heir deployment involves significant fixed costs to be recovered by infras
 tructure owners. Second\, they are congestible facilities\, because the de
 mand for services presses against the available capacity. Generally\, an i
 nfrastructure serves many service markets (such as local/long distance tri
 ps for passenger/freight transport) with varying demand elasticities and p
 roduction technologies. Indeed\, services have different needs in terms of
  infrastructure capacity. As long as facilities are capacity-constrained\,
  if a unit of capacity is used for a given service then it is no longer av
 ailable for alternative services. In this framework\, we aim at studying t
 wo important and related issues: i) Which prices determine the optimal all
 ocation of capacity to the different services?\; and ii) What is the optim
 al infrastructure capacity that is consistent with such prices? We address
  these issues by considering both a budget constraint and a capacity const
 raint for the infrastructure owner\, which is a novelty in the literature.
           
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20190917T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20190917T143000
LAST-MODIFIED:20200212T030237Z
LOCATION:DIAG Room A3
SUMMARY:Workshop 'Critical Issues in Transport Economics' - Jan Brueckner\,
  University of California Irvine
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.diag.uniroma1.it/node/18654
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