Dipartimento di Ingegneria informatica, automatica e gestionale

 

Abstract: In adversarial team games, a team of players sequentially faces a team of adversaries. These games are the simplest setting with multiple players where cooperation and competition coexist, and it is known that the information asymmetry among the team members makes equilibrium approximation computationally hard. Although much effort has been spent designing scalable algorithms, the problem of solving large game instances is open. This work shows that we can recover from this weakness by bridging the gap between sequential adversarial team games and 2-player games. In particular, we propose a new, suitable game representation that we call team public information, in which a team is represented as a single coordinator who only knows information common to the whole team and prescribes to each member an action for any possible private state. The resulting representation is highly explainable, being a 2-player tree in which the team’s strategies are behavioral with a direct interpretation and more expressive than the original extensive form when designing abstractions. Furthermore, we prove the payoff equivalence of our representation, and we provide techniques that, starting directly from the extensive form, generate dramatically more compact representations without information loss. Finally, we experimentally evaluate our techniques when applied to a standard testbed, comparing their performance with the current state of the art.