


Second-Order Know-How Strategies

Pavel Naumov
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
Consider the following traffic situation




Assumption:

- ▶ The driver of car *d* does not notice the stop sign.


Truck b maintains the same speed




Truck b slows down



Truck b accelerates




Truck b accelerates




To prevent a collision, both truck b and car a must accelerate.

Second-order know-how strategies




- Coalition $\{a, b\}$ has a *strategy* to prevent a collision.

Second-order know-how strategies



- ▶ Coalition $\{a, b\}$ has a *strategy* to prevent a collision.
- ▶ Coalition $\{a, b\}$ does not know such a strategy exists.
- ▶ Car c knows what is the strategy of coalition $\{a, b\}$ to avoid a collision.


Second-order know-how strategies





$$w_1 \Vdash H_{\{c\}}^{\{a,b\}} \text{ ("avoid a collision")}$$

$w \Vdash H_C^D \varphi$: if coalition C has distributed knowledge of how coalition D can achieve outcome φ from state w .

Epistemic Transition System



Epistemic Transition System



w_2 : car d is at the spot X

w_3 : car d is not present at the scene

Strategy profile (s_a, s_b)

Domain of actions:

+: to accelerate

–: to slow down

0: to maintain speed

Definition 1

A tuple $(W, \{\sim_a\}_{a \in \mathcal{A}}, \Delta, M, \pi)$ is an (epistemic) transition system, if

1. W is a set (of epistemic states),
2. \sim_a is an indistinguishability equivalence relation on set W for each $a \in \mathcal{A}$,
3. Δ is a nonempty set, called the domain of actions,
4. $M \subseteq W \times \Delta^{\mathcal{A}} \times W$ is an aggregation mechanism,
5. π is a function from propositional variables to subsets of W .

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A *strategy profile of a coalition C* is a tuple of values from Δ indexed by set C . A *complete strategy profile* is a strategy profile of the coalition \mathcal{A} .

Definition 2

Let Φ be the minimal set of formulae such that

1. $p \in \Phi$ for each propositional variable p ,
2. $\neg\varphi, \varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Phi$ for all formulae $\varphi, \psi \in \Phi$,
3. $K_C\varphi, H_C^D\varphi \in \Phi$ for each coalition C , each finite coalition D , and each formula $\varphi \in \Phi$.

Definition 3

For any epistemic state $w \in W$ of a transition system $(W, \{\sim_a\}_{a \in \mathcal{A}}, V, M, \pi)$ and any formula $\varphi \in \Phi$, let relation $w \Vdash \varphi$ be defined as follows:

1. $w \Vdash p$ if $w \in \pi(p)$, where p is a propositional variable,
2. $w \Vdash \neg\varphi$ if $w \not\Vdash \varphi$,
3. $w \Vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$ if $w \not\Vdash \varphi$ or $w \Vdash \psi$,
4. $w \Vdash K_C\varphi$ if $w' \Vdash \varphi$ for each $w' \in W$ such that $w \sim_C w'$,
5. $w \Vdash H_C^D\varphi$ if there is a strategy profile $s \in V^D$ such that for any two states $w', u \in W$ and any complete strategy profile s' , if $w \sim_C w'$, $s =_D s'$, and $(w', s', u) \in M$, then $u \Vdash \varphi$.

Axioms

1. Truth: $K_C\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$,
2. Negative Introspection: $\neg K_C\varphi \rightarrow K_C\neg K_C\varphi$,
3. Distributivity: $K_C(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_C\varphi \rightarrow K_C\psi)$,
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6. Strategic Introspection: $H_C^D\varphi \rightarrow K_C H_C^D\varphi$,
7. Empty Coalition: $K_\emptyset\varphi \rightarrow H_\emptyset^\emptyset\varphi$.

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6. Strategic Introspection: $H_C^D\varphi \rightarrow K_C H_C^D\varphi$,
7. Empty Coalition: $K_\emptyset\varphi \rightarrow H_\emptyset^\emptyset\varphi$.
8. Knowledge of Unavoidability: $K_A H_B^\emptyset\varphi \rightarrow H_A^\emptyset\varphi$.

Inference Rules

1. Necessitation: $\frac{\varphi}{K_C \varphi}$
2. Strategic Necessitation: $\frac{\varphi}{H_C^D \varphi}$
3. Modus Ponens: $\frac{\varphi, \quad \varphi \rightarrow \psi}{\psi}$

Conclusion

AAMAS (International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems) 2018

- ▶ A language for modeling an interplay between the distributed knowledge modality and the second-order coalition know-how modality.
- ▶ A sound and complete logical framework.