

The Escapee Domain: A Multi-Agent Planning Domain

Gregory Gelfond

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Research Fellow

Department of Computer Science

University of Nebraska Omaha

Introduction

The Escapee Domain

The Action Language $m\mathcal{A}+$

Concluding Thoughts

Introduction

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This talk covers a multi-agent planning domain, called the “Escapee Domain”, illustrating some of the interesting issues that arise with multi-agent planning, together with its axiomatization in the language $m\mathcal{A}+$.

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How can *A* escape?

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- In otherwords, not only must he reason about the *physical effects* of his actions, but also about whether or not other agents will *perceive* them.
- Furthermore, to effect his escape, *A* must act in concert with *C*, and this collaborative action is predicated on *A*'s beliefs about *C*.

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- The recognition that both the *direct* and *indirect effects* of actions may alter the physical and epistemic properties of a domain, and the addition of linguistic constructs to represent them.
- The discovery of a certain class of fluents (called *perspective fluents*), which govern how the agents perceive the action occurrences in a given state, and the incorporation of this discovery into the semantics of the language.

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In the slides that follow, we will flesh out these ideas some more in the context of an axiomatization of this domain in $m\mathcal{A}+$.

The Action Language $m\mathcal{A}+$

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- \mathcal{AG} — is a set of agent names;
- \mathcal{F} — is a set of *fluents*;
- \mathcal{A} — is a set of *elementary actions*

In the case of the Escapee Domain, a partial domain signature could be:

$$\mathcal{AG} = \{A, B, C\}$$

$$\mathcal{F} = \{bound(\alpha), attentive(\alpha), free(\alpha), allies(\alpha_1, \alpha_2), united(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)\}$$

$$\mathcal{A} = \{release(\alpha_1, \alpha_2), unite(\alpha_1, \alpha_2), distract(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)\}$$

where α , α_1 , and α_2 are variables over \mathcal{AG} .

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
Generally speaking, such axioms are statements of the form:

$$\mathbf{initially} \ \varphi$$


where φ is a restricted kind of *modal formula*, and have the informal reading of: “ φ is initially true.”

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In $m\mathcal{A}+$, each of these distinct classes of actions is paired with a construct of the language.

The causal relationships between an *ontic action* and its *direct effects* are represented by *dynamic causal laws* which are statements of the form:

$$a \text{ *causes* } f \text{ *if* } \phi$$

where a is an action, f is a fluent literal, and ϕ is a modal formula¹.

¹As with initial state axioms, these are from a syntactically restricted class.

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Perspective axioms allow us to represent the dependance of such indirect effects on the values of *perspective fluents*.

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Generally speaking, such statements have the form:

$$X \textbf{ observes } a \textbf{ if } \phi$$

where X is a set of agents, a is an action, and ϕ is a modal formula.

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where X is a set of agents, a is an action, and ϕ is a modal formula.

Note that the second axiom encodes the idea that attentive agents are aware of occurrences of the action *release* (and hence its consequences).

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Note that this second point requires us to be able to *constrain the executability* of this action to agents who *believe themselves to be allied*.

This kind of constraint may be readily expressed by an *executability condition*, which is a statement of the form:

***executable* a if ϕ**

where a is an action, ϕ is a modal formula.

This leads us to the following axiomatization of the action *unite*:

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along with the requisite perspective axioms².

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With all of these elements in place, a *collaborative action* such as *subdue* may be expressed in a straightforward manner³:

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$subdue(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3)$ **causes** $bound(\alpha_3)$

executable $subdue(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3)$ **if** $united(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$

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Concluding Thoughts

Once the domain has been axiomatized, the semantics of the language enables us to answer questions involving both *temporal projection* and *planning* in such a setting. For example:

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- If *C* however chooses to *distract* agent *B* prior to releasing *A*, his cover will be intact.
- In order for *A* escape, *B* must first be distracted, then *A* must be released. Once this is done, *A* and *C* unite to subdue *B*, after which *A* makes his way to freedom.

In addition, the domain may be extended by the inclusion of communication actions to allow A and C to communicate their allied status rather than making it explicit in the initial state.

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It should be noted that the semantics of $m\mathcal{A}+$ has a natural translation into a logic program under the answer-set semantics. This allows us to reduce *temporal projection* and *planning* to finding the answer sets of programs based on this translation.

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Lastly, the successor to $m\mathcal{A}+$, called $m\mathcal{AL}$ further extends the language by the inclusion of *state constraints* in the manner of \mathcal{AL} .

Thank You